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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN D. WALTON and URSULA
WALTON, his wife; DOUGLAS P.
HOLBROOK and SUZANNE M.
HOLBROOK, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,

Case No. 14532

Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY and SUMMIT
PARK, INC.,
Third-Partv Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought in equity by the PlaintiffsAppellants to compel the State of Utah to either restore certain
property rights taken by the State without the payment of just
compensation or to condemn their property.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment which
had been filed by the State of Utah on the basis that the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Annotated 63-30-1 et. seq. (1953) had not been complied with.
Specifically, the State contended and the Trial Court accepted
the argument that the Plaintiffs1 failure to file written notice
of their claim with the Utah Attorney General within one year
after their cause of action arose barred them for pursuing the
matter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek a reversal of the Summary Judgment
entered by the Trial Court and a chance to proceed with their
case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are the owners of two lots in
the Summit Park Subdivision, which is located east of Salt Lake
City in Summit County.
In 1970 and 1972 (R.114), the State of Utah acquired
(by purchase and condemnation) various lots in the Summit Park
Plat "E" Subdivision in the general vicinity of the lots owned
by the Plaintiffs.

The lots were acquired in connection with

certain planned changes and improvements involving Summit Drive,
a roadway located in the Summit Park Subdivision (see Exhibit A
which is attached to Plaintiffs1 original Complaint - R.3). The
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lots owned by the Plaintiffs were not acquired since the State
apparently believed that the planned work on the roadway would
not result in a taking of any of the property owned by them.
(R.44).
In September of 1972 (R.94) the State completed work on
the roadway.

The result of the work was the elimination of

practical access from the roadway to the cul-de-sac on which
the Plaintiffs1 lots were located and a consequent taking of
the access to Plaintiffs1 property. (R.74).
In August of 1971 (R.109), the State entered into a
lease with Third-Party Defendant Summit County covering part
of the property acquired by the State in connection with the
planned improvements to the roadway.

The property covered by

the lease is located very close to the property owned by the
Plaintiffs.

Summit County proceeded to locate an equipment

shed on the property which, according to the allegations of
Plaintiffs1 Complaint, violated recorded Summit Park Subdivision
Restrictive Covenants (see Exhibit B attached to Plaintiffs1
original Complaint - R.5) and resulted in a taking of Plaintiffs1
property rights of view and light.
Plaintiffs Steven D. Walton and Ursula Walton are residents of the State of Illinois (Walton deposition - p.3). They
had purchased their lot with the thought in mind of someday
moving back to Utah and building a home on it. The first time
that they became aware of what had happened to the property was
in January of 1974 when they traveled to Utah for the funeral
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of Mr. Walton's mother (Walton deposition - p.11).

They con-

tacted a lawyer and this case was thereafter filed in August
of 1974.
Plaintiffs Douglas P. Holbrook and Suzanne M . Holbrook
are residents of Salt Lake City, Utah. They too purchased
their lot with the idea of eventually building a home on it.
(Holbrook deposition - p.4).

Mr. Holbrook testified that he

first became aware of what the State had done to the property in
late 1972 or early 1973 (Holbrook deposition - pp.9,10).

Mr.

and Mrs. Holbrook became a part of this action when, with leave
of the Court, an Amended Complaint was filed naming them as
parties plaintiff in December of 1975. (R.74).
ISSUE

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Under the circumstances of this case, are the Plaintiffs
barred from prosecuting this equitable action by the one year
limitation period contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DOES NOT PROTECT THE STATE FROM SUIT AND THUS,
IN A CASE SUCH AS THIS ONE, THERE IS NO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH
IN THE STATUTES BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAIVED
ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
In 1965 the State Legislature enacted the Utah Governmental
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Immunity Act (Utah Code Annotated 63-30-1 et. seq. (1953)),thereby
waiving its immunity from suit for certain designated governmental
activities. In connection with this waiver of immunity,procedures
and time periods were established for presenting and thereafter
prosecuting claims which were authorized by the waiver.
However, long before the passage of this legislation this
Court held that the defense of sovereign immunity had no application where the State had taken property, in the constitutional
sense, without having agreed to compensate the property owner or
instituted condemnation proceedings. State v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1938). The
Court specifically approved the issuance of an injunction under
circumstances where property is taken or damaged for public use
without appropriate steps being taken in an eminent domain proceeding, and held that governmental immunity is not available
as a defense where the aid of equity is sought with respect to
an act forbidden by law.
In the case of Hampton v. State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d
342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), this Court again held that the defense
of sovereign immunity was not available in an equitable action
involving an alleged taking of a property right (in that case,
as in the instant case, the right of access to property).
Since equitable actions of the sort initiated by the
Appellants had been approved by this Court well prior to the
passage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and since, in
such equitable actions, it has always been the rule that the
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concept of laches, rather than the otherwise applicable statute
of limitations applies (Fisher v. Davis, 11 Utah 81, 291 Pac. 493
(1930)), the question is whether the State Legislature intended
to apply the limitation provisions contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to such equitable actions. It is interesting
to note that the full title of the Act which was designated as
S.B. 4 and was passed by the Legislature in 1965 was "An Act
Relating to the Immunity of the State, Its Agencies and Political
Subdivisions from Actions at Law; Providing for Exemption Thereto,
for the Purchase of Liability Insurance, and for the Payment of
Claims and Judgments" (emphasis added).

Laws of Utah, 1965,

Ch. 139, pg. 390. A review of the provisions of the Act supports
the conclusion that it was intended to apply to actions at law
for damages and that nothing contained therein was directed
towards equitable actions with respect to which the State had
already been held to be not immune.
Thus, it seems clear that the limitation provision contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which is relied
upon by the State has absolutely no application to this equitable
action and that the Trial Court erred in applying it.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF EQUITY, SHOULD
HAVE APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF LACHES, RATHER THAN THE
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS PERIOD.

UNDER THE STANDARD OF

LACHES THE PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION WAS

TIMELY COMMENCED

AND IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED.

"The doctrine of laches has existed since
the beginning of equity jurisdiction and its
existence and application are independent of
statutes of limitation". 30A C.J.S. "Equity" §113.
Whereas statutes of limitation are based upon a fixed time period,
the equitable concept of "laches" is not.

This Court has held

that the basic standard to be applied where laches is asserted
as a defense is whether the plaintiff neglected, for an unreasonable length of time, and under circumstances suggesting a lack of
diligence, to pursue his claim. Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western
Mining and Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338 (1938).
Sometimes, however, courts of equity will consider the
statute of limitations which would apply to a suit at law in
considering the question of laches, though the statute is not
binding and other factors such as diligence on the part of the
plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant will usually be given
principal consideration in deciding whether the action should be
permitted to proceed. 30A C.J.S. "Equity" §131. Thus, it might
be helpful to consider what the statute of limitations period was
which applied at the time that this Court approved the bringing
of actions in equity under the circumstances involved in this case.
The statute of limitations which seems to have the closest
relationship to a case such as this one is Utah Code Annotated
78-12-26 (1953), which requires that actions for injury to real
property be brought within three years after the cause of action
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accrued* This statute should be considered in light of the rule
that,
"Courts of equity generally decline to apply
the statute where the plaintiff neither knew
nor had reasonable means for knowing of the
existence of a cause of action . . •"
51 Am* Jur. 2d "Limitation of Actions" §146.
Taking into account the concept of laches, the statute
of limitations which has the closest relationship to these facts
and the equitable rule that lack of knowledge of facts giving
rise to a cause of action on the part of the plaintiff will be
considered in applying the statute, the Appellants believe that
it will be obvious that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the
action on the basis that it had not been timely filed.
Plaintiffs' property rights were taken at the following
times:
1. Sometime subsequent to August of 1971 the large
equipment shed was moved onto property owned by
the State which is located very close to the
Plaintiffs1 property.

This action resulted in a

taking of the right that the Plaintiffs had to have
the applicable restrictive covenants complied with
and a taking of their rights of light and view.
2. In September of 1972 the State completed work on
Summit Drive, cutting off the access to Plaintiffs1
property.
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Plaintiffs Steven D. Walton and Ursula Walton became aware of
what had happened to their property in January of 1974, and
Plaintiffs Douglas P. Holbrook and Suzanne M . Holbrook became
aware of what had happened to their property in late 1972 or
early 1973. This action was filed by the Waltons in August of
1974 and the Holbrooks became parties in December of 1975.
Based upon these facts, the
action was

Appellants submit that this

timely filed. It was initiated within six months after

the Waltons became aware that they had been injured and the
Holbrooks became parties within three years after they learned
of the Statefs actions.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court incorrectly applied a statute of limitations
which has no application to this equitable proceeding. Actions
such as this one are not covered by sovereign immunity and the
statute of limitations contained in the Act by which the State
waived part of its immunity specifically applies only to actions at
law. It has no bearing on cases such as this one where the State
has never been immune from suit.
The Plaintiffs-Appellants pursued their claims against the
State with reasonable diligence after they became aware of them and,
under the circumstances, the defense of laches does not apply. The
decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and the matter
should be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
315 East Second South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellant
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